Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3f50f24fe04fa886…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

48.0 KB First seen: 2022-09-02
MD5: 44cb145fe1a58354167ba2377a949a56 SHA-1: 64438bace7692d416b8d48af03558b9621146227 SHA-256: 3f50f24fe04fa8867ddc6f5043d1960c0d31e0b86ec1e722f989d0e0aad93f29
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a password-encrypted Office document that leverages the CVE-2017-0199 vulnerability. This vulnerability allows the document to act as a remote loader, fetching and executing a secondary payload from the embedded URL. The document's encrypted nature and the specific exploit indicate a malicious intent to deliver further malware.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://dummy_username@172.245.142.47/........---.......--__-_-----_----....-------/www_j/www.doc