Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3f1f2f8374d41a59…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.59 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: d8a8a9e029ae744d12fc28d6d9a18f2d SHA-1: 60b8ff8ed0d458ffbc3b7cd17c0b149dc5c1850b SHA-256: 3f1f2f8374d41a597c022b0943511ea8fed6c67b4b58f0e4a6601dcb22bdb98c
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell T1204 User Execution

The file is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the CVE-2017-8759 vulnerability through MSXML SAX OLE activation. This indicates an attempt to exploit the user to execute malicious code. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics further supports the embedding and activation of malicious OLE content.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00189ecd.bin
c1eeed9fb9685b47fc0c072b6bd8c50297086f664eea5fabeb2e7007b4a06ea6		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x189ECD 3739 bytes

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