Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3eff599edb6ce41d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

90.5 KB Created: 2021-07-20 07:32:41 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-16
MD5: 17807aa28edf6d7fb9a908717e045311 SHA-1: bc4639537fd74e1ca7cae120741ebd7f9db3583b SHA-256: 3eff599edb6ce41dd20cec492923a516488ed126378f99ee396887fba0719068
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains embedded scripts and numerous links pointing to compromised websites, suggesting an attempt to distribute further malicious content. The embedded script mentions 'Powershell find string in files', indicating a potential execution or information gathering attempt. The presence of multiple compromised CMS upload links and SEO-optimized disposable hosting links reinforces the phishing and malware distribution vector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9835

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://dazzlin.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e7a8553954ae269731a81903a3dac50e/2189018580.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://ylpqzl.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/xadix.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.1000ena.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16096149825df4---72322779791.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://perfectthesale.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160f0260571f2d---legumido.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://carthink.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160eff2056d79a---76747734108.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://yarpaket.ru/userfiles/file/satedepovanopudo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cnc-soustruzeni.cz/files/file/lifadaduzafela.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gabortech.com/admin/file/kavover.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://doitoutdoorz.com/file/44wA3GzrPky3oQbM.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bestrecycledautoparts.net/images_i/file/rajugesule.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://glass-haus.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/241de91601e55df409d5fecb1600d522/17196934188.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://inglewoodreunion.com/clients/68690/File/ranokiterupinonavowadaked.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://localhomesales.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160e8d24446337---fatomodefabijisaki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sheeld.org/clients/d/d0/d021426cee8527c21a172be12ef3d645/File/33205120677.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://apexforestservices.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d1b66976b4b---41063268572.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mashhadgardi724.ir/basefile/mashhadgardi724/files/waraxufimiwamubes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sambelteri.com/contents//files/dupude.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://churchliferesources.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609f093c384ac---zogijerupemudevupok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://broadmoor79.com/clients/864886/File/93360058806.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ackerviewguesthouse.com/userfiles/file/wozowated.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.landalastadservice.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16094b7b8e647a---pagoragemigevakutarij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fcv-bo.org/data/fcv-bo/userfiles/file/96751265527.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cafemocion.com/userfiles/file/nubetivikelaliludit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.insurancedirectcanada.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16081e3a785ffd---50217221286.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nowackleverkusen.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16094397876533---xalot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/3CAf4wW3hvY/uplcv?utm_term=powershell+find+string+in+filesPDF link annotation
    • https://mediaget.com/userfiles/files/93237339818.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_000164bd.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x164BD 1576 bytes
SHA-256: 62b0b66caebd5a5bb03c18ddd0676994c719b01e1b57dc3277dcb0947b9b2815
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='QPDF'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Cinede Wahozami</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell find string in files.   The Get-ChildItem cmdlet supports wildcarding through three parameters: Path The -Path parameter i</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Powershell find string in files.   The Get-ChildItem cmdlet supports wildcarding through three parameters: Path The -Path parameter i</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell find string in files</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='QPDF'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-01-22T07:39:05'
  xmp:CreatorTool='QPDF'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='175974e5-fbc1-4617-b7bd-a16c4dbabdb3'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='771974b9-4bc5-4f86-bfe6-945fba5e447d'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000fc67.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFC67 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0001147e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1147E 10560 bytes
SHA-256: 044b62ba30d58efd687cf1b2bd4fcc10441d0bf10280f525234193213328a064
font_02_sfnt_off00012c58.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12C58 18160 bytes
SHA-256: f84f0a4a25580a738fb59bf47193d0d5b4929d2c761ad396e28159de32fdbe8b

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