Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3ee3ed8d994807ab…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.7 KB Created: 2021-06-27 23:27:10 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: d8c63d061513eb7cf5735fd106783b2b SHA-1: 52e08f1144bf46ba67e4b30330ddc00463a4e727 SHA-256: 3ee3ed8d994807ab3e336cca2058ec7e928f64799a6d98898e961e2b956af04e
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a link farm directing to multiple compromised CMS upload locations, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the nature of the URLs and the 'SE_INVOICE_LURE' heuristic point towards a social engineering attack, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9951

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.tangelo.no/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160929a4d58142---31181861474.pdf
    • http://www.k-24.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16099d15d82ddc---32022809314.pdf
    • https://chezgregoire.fr/userfiles/20014525115.pdf
    • https://festival.bg/fckeditorfiles/file/kesojezef.pdf
    • http://lbs.ac.at/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/rh62qrd2assp24thliovah9t8r/50578712784.pdf
    • https://mkontakt.pl/dat//file/kakixujekefabugile.pdf
    • http://www.medicalalliedtraining.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607185c03ec12---mukegokowefedusumevosod.pdf
    • https://www.tctnanotech.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5edbeeea4c654c2418c17191e58f4b78/sevimewewefemokabasixer.pdf
    • https://takiminsahada.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/hl0tv5opmk68d5c2ojhf3pbh2k/wezogigili.pdf
    • https://alphacleanwashing.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8ec9248e1bfa849d8247b3abebf416d1/45271090846.pdf
    • http://www.next-conseil.fr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d220e522375---julufetufesuwila.pdf
    • http://bilagroup.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606fe9c16e88f---73756568694.pdf
    • https://cailux.lu/userfiles/files/xesamibabufovugijix.pdf
    • http://stacjaregeneracja.pl/userfiles/file/38282887585.pdf
    • http://www.kissdocs.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16080875f2c65b---rodetavumazifenitob.pdf
    • http://tokyoracing.hu/userfiles/file/58205782394.pdf
    • https://www.lightingsolutionsal.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3556d3d958b389b7c2e61afc05247a5e/81496289819.pdf
    • http://www.hptindia.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b26d4c6ede9---15825003053.pdf
    • http://cricalliance.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16083bf204710c---49404189892.pdf
    • https://backcountryplayground.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8b25c44f4f7330aeb6fb9468ddaa9200/jelobodagalixakerunafen.pdf
    • https://spencershaulageltd.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a93b62fc8ab6a65629113a1f45eb84e9/87196471259.pdf
    • https://china-glass-mosaic.com/userfiles/files/20210611_021944.pdf
    • http://ggmtc.net/userfiles/files/16974439332.pdf
    • http://www.theflightfest.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16077cdfec932a---mimuwumu.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/A3Ryygt5BCM/uplcv?utm_term=tally+objective+type+questions+and+answers
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e89a.bin
f0b49df62fcfe0f3e2dac3784bf5b41b33bb57898f93074b5697f54955592439
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE89A 17092 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00011555.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11555 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012d6c.bin
31957a4325f290d235a939bc4966840cd582777ca8965ecc0c2b86c552f900f5
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12D6C 11252 bytes