PDF malware analysis — malicious · 3edf43a2e0535f70

MALICIOUS

PDF

17.8 KB Created: 2010-08-29 16:19:36 Authoring application: styeZek colSnap

MD5: b9d3fd57b7cf2cebace4cc70ce5f15f7 SHA-1: 2f8b0d8bf073cb1ded42fe3e264ca5816e0b9ea8 SHA-256: 3edf43a2e0535f70e1b4d8456a75cde4eca3cbb9f1378ec56b84d6165b2be24c

168 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious File Execution T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious PDF T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF file contains embedded scripts and is flagged by multiple heuristics, including PDF_XFA_SCRIPT and ML_NYX_PDF_MALICIOUS, indicating it is designed to exploit vulnerabilities. ClamAV detection as Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-81 further confirms its malicious nature. The primary attack pattern involves leveraging embedded scripts within the XFA form to execute a malicious payload, likely a downloader for further stages.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

XFA form contains risky executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT

PDF embeds an XFA form whose script block contains exploit, submission/launch, or shell-execution primitives. Ordinary LiveCycle print/update scripts are left as generic XFA/JS signals unless stronger behavior is present.
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-81 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-81
Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
XFA form low PDF_XFA

PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_file_obj0008.bin` `d81baa73e490e4cb879e13927cacd1dd1be37524a37eac51603e15117c578777`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x20D	84 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0009.bin` `24c130f03a4cf51d470b536e94c1e58af67665739e200e0ce198ad41086243c0`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 9 at offset 0x2BE	228 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0010.bin` `c2976762bba880873ad3e10ff1a3bfb2e91804de49e3addee9ca9791451bdbe5`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 10 at offset 0x3AD	1322 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0011.bin` `c97e0522381d6196cc0695f35f4d065f15c9c86a9601a7f776c6afd3f4c6b460`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 11 at offset 0x6DE	199 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0012.bin` `7ccaa77c13bc5d76d886bb2cdc9cfd3c90e1372df1e9df41600e3d7c40709473`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 12 at offset 0x7D0	34208 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0013.bin` `e6c26a3478346d27e841ad49868ebf68bf4c6863b6750e8d60bda3c4c6f79876`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 13 at offset 0x427C	77 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0014.bin` `92a3ce61d783e15932b5de127ce45a9b4c2f98f4da2453f65241573c1dda808a`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 14 at offset 0x4323	56 bytes

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