Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3eb5a92bacab0fe5…

MALICIOUS

RTF

27.0 KB First seen: 2023-02-16
MD5: b921193b8cb7b6e92332c09ddaf1202c SHA-1: 31c37e15a80955daa12b37439e12f4f73c896216 SHA-256: 3eb5a92bacab0fe5c84e9e519deed2585124bdb255a6b687ca47cdeffd566a59
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an OLE object with the CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046, which is indicative of the Equation Editor. Heuristics confirm the presence of a CVE-2017-11882 Equation Editor Ole10Native payload, suggesting the exploitation of this known vulnerability to execute arbitrary code. The presence of ".\objdata" and ".\objupdate" directives further supports the exploitation of OLE object vulnerabilities.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 likely critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    RTF decodes to an activated Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE storage whose payload is a high-entropy Ole10Native stream rather than normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is a weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape consistent with CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802.
  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000201a.bin
db4dae7dbc669ec36b2f2e0820ded3137ca8a2b38db7c5ddd68f1a4f946b8644
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x201A 4205 bytes