Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3ead70e86af04ce4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.31 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-10-03
MD5: 2f94639355e43f44bfb2167207bf6e17 SHA-1: 61fbe9869c03bfaf31237382a476bb32d7c3fa1f SHA-256: 3ead70e86af04ce4441ac9da7ba8238e4a006466954c3a8d9e44e17f4e920652
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The file contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object, in turn, contains a PDF that has suspicious static findings and a direct link to a payload. The VBA macros are present but contain no executable statements, indicating they are not the primary infection vector. The embedded PDF's direct payload link is the most critical finding.

Heuristics 8

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
557b2dcdffb52a311fe3ba1573b4809c80fbaef1a9043dc9cb356b77ae7ec7a7		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0002A53F/oLE10NatIve 1368 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0002c600.pdf
30685b1caf9c5c545d548abe597f8b1072cabafe327793c10f5d4dbdaf765cc7		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x2C600 1194496 bytes
stream_004_off00005d60.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5D60 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
e2cca4de56b55d83ed45ec5d864c5ab5b321f954fbb6004d226518806e526e07		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1371648 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006600.pdf
00a1f03605bc6fdd15d1ac3381e07ac282935f873457778f5d2801b16da75a9b		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6600 1350144 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0004b000.pdf
323f3dbca7e24082b27c0579116b3e6d60d2e40d9fffede25e75e7ee667ca207		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x4B000 1069056 bytes

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