Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 13

• Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
  PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
• JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
  PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
• Adobe Reader JavaScript heap-spray exploit (known CVE family) critical CVE related PDF_JS_KNOWN_CVE_HEAPSPRAY_FAMILY
  PDF JavaScript combines heap-spray staging (NOP-sled / shellcode nybble sled or a multi-kilobyte setTimeOut/setInterval launcher) with the removed Adobe Reader sink getAnnots, associated with CVE-2009-1492. Benign documents never pair heap-spray with these long-removed APIs. The exact malformed argument is assembled at run time, so this attributes the exploit to a known pre-2011 Reader CVE family rather than the exact primitive.
• PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
  PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
• Flate image XObject contains x86 NOP sled high CVE related PDF_FLATE_IMAGE_NOP_SLED
  PDF embeds a FlateDecode image XObject whose decoded bytes are dominated by x86 NOP instructions, alongside form or embedded-file delivery structures. This is exploit payload staging evidence and is related to Adobe Reader parser-exploit families, but it is not a unique CVE fingerprint by itself.
• XFA JavaScript heap-spray exploit code critical PDF_XFA_HEAP_SPRAY
  PDF contains XFA script content with heap-spray or shellcode-like JavaScript markers such as large encoded word sequences, util.pack, large arrays, or spray variable names. This is a weaponised Adobe Reader exploit pattern, not a normal interactive form.
• Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
  PDF has 2 image(s), only 1 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 147 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
• Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
  PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
• XFA form low PDF_XFA
  PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic (matched inside decoded stream)
• Embedded script payload in PDF stream info PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
  PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text

  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
  • http://cgi.adobe.com/special/acrobat/updateReferenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.4/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.7/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-form/2.8/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xtd/In PDF document text

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.