Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3e44d78b1288d9f4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

194.0 KB
MD5: 75c1dc5a01af36f92503625d2c306c65 SHA-1: 954b97ffbfbd26d919db13cddc12d02d71eda274 SHA-256: 3e44d78b1288d9f469f1acce17803e3c8a2c08149caacd0f12f40c6a0a9e83d0
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a password-protected Office document that exploits CVE-2017-0199. This vulnerability allows it to act as a remote loader, downloading a secondary payload from the URL http://systemsecureserverprotocolgooglegood.duckdns.org/gd/invoice.doc. The document's structure and the specific exploit indicate a malicious intent to compromise the user's system.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://systemsecureserverprotocolgooglegood.duckdns.org/gd/invoice.doc

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.