Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3e3d89183a60492c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.3 KB Created: 2021-09-05 04:52:36 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 2e7bf554f950181bf59f745a3ddcba19 SHA-1: 877291e90f39e50544cd719f15a7bf62b2b2c1f7 SHA-256: 3e3d89183a60492c282b1f35e19448f4dd715e1bd3b36feace3a18575f5e7a80
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, exhibiting characteristics of a phishing and malware delivery lure. It presents a fake download button and instructions for handling a password-protected archive, common tactics to bypass gateway security and trick users into executing malicious content. The embedded URLs, many pointing to unknown or potentially compromised sites, suggest an attempt to host or redirect to malicious payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9977

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://dentalrud.com/userfiles/file/26518009425.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://conomiya.com/images/uploadedimages/file/mafazima.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--80aagkbrca3apkgkee0a1bi.xn--p1ai/ckfinder/userfiles/files/xupikewamejavu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fortlauderdale-carservice.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161098732116db---11709135585.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.reenactmentmarket.eu/images/wyswig_images/file/zijefi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rnsnider-classof-68.com/clients/9/9a/9aaec9a1f64917203b32d8bba7bf2533/File/potutabawuzapugivixa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vencedor.coop/images/admin/file/30171048783.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cpsguffanti.com/uploads/file/71126361460.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cameranichietsu.com/luutru/files/52608384775.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://peaceinsrilanka.lk/userfiles/file/futedazefokurok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bharatbiodiesel.com/userfiles/file/11672665828.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://iescolumbus.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d21dd3fcfa635ef9c8d709c61d177b50/86621564919.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.centralperdana.com/file/bemodidilokadodiguwi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aihyang.com/userfiles/file/77269731119.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stylist.in.ua/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609e6a6762649---wozab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mientaytourist.com/uploads/files/nigemewikuritedeziv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://deltaguvenlik.net/userfiles/file/30648173596.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.uvhk.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607e999fd0bae---92730790607.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://crownprolaw.com/userfiles/Proj_Name/files/venafolur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.adatechotomasyon.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160767f6c457f6---pezukukabopopizufi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://widepolymers.com/userfiles/file/54558025878.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xistenze.com/files/files/6238217644.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://planet-for-events.de/userfiles/file/80251763337.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/6naE_Nh8_CY/uplcv?utm_term=zotero+connector+download+pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e13c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE13C 10400 bytes
SHA-256: 8eeaf5b9125292a6831c85e19cb56c9b57d6ad24028a634302ab9c2d5245a314
font_01_sfnt_off0000f8ff.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF8FF 18280 bytes
SHA-256: 752bdd8b967eb49923230fb0918b0dcc29269be3b7aebad314d8b9f9dc4ab967
font_02_sfnt_off00012740.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12740 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.