Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3e2e0c5890dd03ef…

MALICIOUS

PDF

65.0 KB Created: 2020-10-09 00:11:04 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-19
MD5: 3f41bd7adadf8f90f186f279efe8a734 SHA-1: 7fe366a14ce16aac7f02c884ea9b3f8a603400a7 SHA-256: 3e2e0c5890dd03efe22c07ee63bfb1a65533ef2a0190d261acc81094af029143
234 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/pify?keyword=darnified+ui+new+vegas+fonts In PDF document text
    • https://site-1038810.mozfiles.com/files/1038810/rabaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1041210.mozfiles.com/files/1041210/soxizuwevifew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037103.mozfiles.com/files/1037103/wupotenif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1042287.mozfiles.com/files/1042287/77603589562.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.literacycenterofharlingen.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438667/laferi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sudonu.chevana.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874523/f3ca396742b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gakegasu.candidworldreport.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637136/a2e82c2d3075b7e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://poxok.devolinadventures.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874038/vobov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/2172/8919/files/constitution_life_insurance_company_address.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/1624/0807/files/77322251752.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0481/4661/2373/files/1953_cadillac_for_sale_craigslist.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/2961/0141/files/btd5_battles_hacked.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/3556/4949/files/sitiwutomabepalogopak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0481/0044/2275/files/27041847353.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0495/9174/6712/files/lizuvu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ae3a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAE3A 5076 bytes
SHA-256: efdad0ee77b113733e84cb0812a1f2919608dbd0012136141d4828d23e895f06
font_01_sfnt_off0000bfa5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBFA5 12636 bytes
SHA-256: a0d228eccae5e80abf75ded83b3a03b61478108967e38ba171d1d47928c72226
font_02_sfnt_off0000e88b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE88B 4324 bytes
SHA-256: a542ec26cea93e049a2e27cd59b1347dd9bbdea13775fd7b822b3c2b3136116f

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