Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3e191e1965469631…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.5 KB Created: 2021-02-27 05:00:26 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-16
MD5: e1878acf95acd368d5eca7209a13d35a SHA-1: 27abeaa5fa08c592db0124dc8531423885e93293 SHA-256: 3e191e1965469631643a1dfc5f069276de2a78be4d91ffee897dae2b37768b44
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF contains embedded script content and numerous external links, some of which are flagged as unknown or benign, suggesting a link farm or phishing attempt. The heuristic 'PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM' indicates a large number of external links, and 'PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD' points to executable content within the PDF. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate maliciousness, likely for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://lozipotod.ru/award?keyword=windows+powershell+commands+cheat+sheet PDF link annotation
    • https://jiparebifipi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134638028/juzetef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4456379/normal_5ffff67673730.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://boleturem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134398498/ec6e3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4409602/normal_601ff13d98275.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kitakilesa/grade_3_maths_worksheets_printable.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rimiwomo.epizy.com/does_tracfone_do_wifi_calling.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nafibanefexex/lojidox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://buxodanukesidup.epizy.com/96454178908.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sojaxub/asus_uefi_bios_utility_windows_7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zetubakuz/lojozazese.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sefeluxezilire.epizy.com/42947386597.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00014083.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x14083 1630 bytes
SHA-256: 7ce5054463150b451b2723ee7be835fcd3c20fb3acc07cb2901c0e16c20d7401
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='pdf-parser'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Navorayodo Delerogi</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Windows powershell commands cheat sheet. Instantly share the code, notes, and snippets. PowerShell Cheat Sheet / Fast Link You can&#39;t perform </rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Windows powershell commands cheat sheet. Instantly share the code, notes, and snippets. PowerShell Cheat Sheet / Fast Link You can&#39;t perform </rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Windows powershell commands cheat sheet</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='pdf-parser'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-04-19T05:14:19'
  xmp:CreatorTool='pdf-parser'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='387ce5d6-58ff-4bb4-b16f-f192603662d7'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='b007b360-ae0e-4ce4-89cd-53b240a6e1a1'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000f5e1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF5E1 5208 bytes
SHA-256: 2f0f09a1a0e43f286cbf118ac9081eb8cd5d8f307b3e5bc441b3f7f03606483a
font_01_sfnt_off00010771.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10771 10300 bytes
SHA-256: 8b747bf668227326c7dd7884e93e4715ffb2883b235780169720c8824df83df1
font_02_sfnt_off00012abb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12ABB 4324 bytes
SHA-256: a542ec26cea93e049a2e27cd59b1347dd9bbdea13775fd7b822b3c2b3136116f