Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3e182b7a7af8f09f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

873.9 KB First seen: 2019-05-16
MD5: 0f1827b72d05842dcb534459bc414d1c SHA-1: 71b62f60326c8d027af34a5c1f39ae2d7a325266 SHA-256: 3e182b7a7af8f09fa8e9c6b371e056ec89a52aac9e6b0fafb8f9180aaae82d36
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of malicious OLE object data, specifically related to CVE-2017-8570. This vulnerability allows for the dropping of an SCT script, which is then likely executed to download and run a second-stage payload. The embedded OLE object data, particularly at offset 0xD92C8, is the primary indicator of this exploit.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 7 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/v3/contenttype/formsIn RTF body
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000025.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x25 205 bytes
SHA-256: 75a725fc96463ea024899f12597b26031b1a5d84ddd2de407d47914073b3db59
objdata_01_off000001ee.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1EE 385227 bytes
SHA-256: 203b7abe932f01f3f6a7eb36cbe46ac18d1fac0c57c566a846f7a793d7cb4eb8
objdata_02_off000bedd7.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBEDD7 1068 bytes
SHA-256: 2b28d78ceb2a564ae30f2b6865926b068f3f920a373c2e3fc4cb865091eddd89
objdata_03_off000bf668.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBF668 51404 bytes
SHA-256: f1610a5bc8dc649cc9ab31720cfc79b8997d59aed4c8547e159ef92d1223ca13
objdata_04_off000d8838.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD8838 369 bytes
SHA-256: 3c0b4878e98d51d984a06b9ba36e54869ecd67e41f335730fced4ca28976d877
objdata_05_off000d8b56.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD8B56 890 bytes
SHA-256: 21dcdf875b1972c61c0e8c2c2123f9a95c8f29fb4a2cf8bf52511b328881de8e
objdata_06_off000d92c8.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD92C8 2633 bytes
SHA-256: 27c6d10cfe7974ebf40c1200cc005f9878cc37b7d49ece9cbc396d700c38918a