Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3e08ed74ce3ce289…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.2 KB
MD5: 588b6395862188af88024304d14224a0 SHA-1: 918e0ddcea3cae482c7ce7f96f45ad13544c0df8 SHA-256: 3e08ed74ce3ce289bf30eae23ea0eb8cd40c33035d2ac63173470086af76737e
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the embedded OLE object, likely containing malicious code, will be activated upon opening the document, leading to exploitation.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000ce.bin
fe514109728b847b0074cc99fd0b0145ea45e1f7d53bfd36db7fba8ed5a807ce
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xCE 1888 bytes