Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3de4f01f1d7dd1fb…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.25 MB
MD5: a8840b25a7d7281e67fee62bbd8985ef SHA-1: 691b36689b19134e32bf9ae2183daa75a1e98906 SHA-256: 3de4f01f1d7dd1fb8b8f24aad9e267bfc0cc5009d44b66ad52ae65ae55fc9ae9
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML file is encrypted with a default password and contains embedded OLE objects, specifically identified as Equation Editor components. This strongly suggests it is an exploit carrier designed to deliver a malicious payload. The presence of Equation Editor OLE objects is a known indicator for exploitation of vulnerabilities within that component.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.