Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3de3f4e33c2a5e70…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.8 KB Created: 2021-09-18 19:10:16 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 70de79d8c79838028dca033c212e19d1 SHA-1: 52c54f641e58883dd6f8e87cd9cbaf00bb57365e SHA-256: 3de3f4e33c2a5e708d7ddbd615153264afbfbf5691b7764ce147467c146e430a
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF contains embedded JavaScript and a high number of links pointing to compromised WordPress uploads and disposable hosting domains, strongly indicating a phishing or malware distribution lure. The embedded JavaScript likely facilitates the redirection or download of a malicious payload. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier further support its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9975

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://brunoamaranti.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/g2shg92ps8ujlutrns588oeus3/48701047696.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://goldendoodlesofthesierranevadas.com/userfiles/file/bimuveduvonikiragotirigu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://msmzizkov.cz/data/dokumenty/putaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://robertmatzuzi-massagetherapist.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613e637f43268---69397171402.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://yishiweb.com/upfiles/files/20210913_230444.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://idolyokocho.com/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/37447655823.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://agisinfo.ru/uploads/content/files/33796563634.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kasaitogo.com/uploads/files/mutojikumusininekana.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://goksirkrupskimlyn.pl/img/upload/files/97467361349.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://patroha.hu/file/vivapusenitamizenuwuti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://am-assets.com/aom/magnolia/userfiles/file/4702001512.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.oasipizza.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161406a0d69b7a---76249561723.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://khonggianmang.com/upload/files/95049208965.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://timatey.kz/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/l7o9m5gdh88smbvbloso4feq53/13170170530.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.toptalentusa.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613730c0a6a2e---27224479681.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://proia.bg/userfiles/file/musofumawelinijeba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cr2tek.com/userfiles/Proj_Name/files/mafis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lngpetro.com/userfiles/file/zepogoxadezozalenixuxo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://trade.inter-ural.ru/ckfinder/userfiles/files/85686164538.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.kiteschule-eckernfoerde.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161356ca028a8e---zibukerobewawezubufobeniz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://linuxnewyork.com/draft/media/gaxodado.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hankyunget.net/userData/board/file/60014064797.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lotusromeo.fr/app/webroot/files/userfiles/files/savitiwibosupolilorizut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://yachtales.net/admin/userfiles/files/zebavozak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://viaterrestre.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613dde9be54c3---94900464960.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/YTWXjIUwRh0/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+scan+a+qr+code+screenshot+on+iphonePDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cec6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCEC6 17556 bytes
SHA-256: 85437c0360d2f9a971dae487453f46429129d25e2a1692180e7e2b35c53a15d7
font_01_sfnt_off0000fc6a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFC6A 10788 bytes
SHA-256: e0b339a8df0042336d4798b8c0f14a58b6274387b811351977b73d126ff99c2b
font_02_sfnt_off00011506.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11506 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1