Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3de3d5dda121aae6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.5 KB
MD5: 2496144c5c67e2df57fdceeff48e6d43 SHA-1: d88674adb5406166d6ac4f402aa85d740a3aa5b5 SHA-256: 3de3d5dda121aae64caaa405dd978dd1f0320d6cf71ed3876ebdcc8e405d6e2a
138 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious File

The sample is a PDF file that exploits the CVE-2010-0188 vulnerability in Adobe Reader. This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code when a user opens a specially crafted PDF. The PDF contains an XFA form with an embedded script payload, which is the mechanism used to trigger the exploit. No specific malware family could be identified, but the exploit's nature suggests a downloader or dropper.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
c4538ad469548365480fd31276514c3c7e78a01c87adf68b2dd25009eacd86b8
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101173 bytes