PDF malware analysis — malicious · 3ddbb2e01a7bb288

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.9 KB

MD5: 1abbdf3dd3f295bbad369806126eb992 SHA-1: 1939aae3d08769d49c3a3f7d2735e16eaf5ed98b SHA-256: 3ddbb2e01a7bb288f2c5b47be00814f261c971cd8cd83bd76e9dadfa3556898f

178 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF file exploits CVE-2010-0188, a vulnerability in Adobe Reader related to XFA forms and LibTIFF. The presence of XFA forms and an eval() call indicates an attempt to execute embedded script. This script likely attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload, as suggested by the embedded file artifact.

Heuristics 8

Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188

PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT

PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
eval() call high PDF_EVAL

eval() found — commonly used for obfuscated exploit execution
Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
XFA form low PDF_XFA

PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
- http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/
- http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xtd/
- http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xfdf/
- http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-form/2.8/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_file_obj0008.bin` `04462f810d6eacdacecc9d0a5f3f81bebc722af4415e04da19b520338f642b51`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xD7	67 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0009.bin` `5c22d8a763a73b763d2ab66d21a4f9cd8f141b27bb1e81aff272c9870dc6327b`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 9 at offset 0x162	677 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0010.bin` `c8d1e5d9e8f23ed8143683c5c2e616b10c60ca116f935aac77ad7d6c8369f839`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 10 at offset 0x452	224 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`embedded_file_obj0011.bin` `c1736a116e2c17bd66292ac9cd5a1dda22c6e51f1c290200190c71f5cf8fbd07`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 11 at offset 0x57D	38049 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0012.bin` `6dfc2cfc739bf5cd5514e048143c782a1af7b4c86ed10bd88203471efa9b3fe7`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 12 at offset 0x9A69	389 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0014.bin` `9f69c42e66b0c1666412737dc9cf4aa42379ee793c4ad8d07130781756ea33d5`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 14 at offset 0x9C3B	65 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0015.bin` `51d6d76eddb1746e412f89f4d1c1b0d620c60fb4a5641c018e93871be63968a9`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 15 at offset 0x9CC6	147 bytes

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