Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3dcaa0b63b9f9a13…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

31.6 KB Created: 2017-12-04 15:11:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2017-12-24
MD5: 09d84b1d5d04f24a34f65136b5a92cd8 SHA-1: 4754e52ac419f8cf21a759b5bce3189a52045f69 SHA-256: 3dcaa0b63b9f9a138336bb62cebe77d5d6be78b9875e034d5591c6683b5d0a60
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an OOXML document that contains an embedded OLE object, identified as a potential CVE-2026-21514 exploitation vector. The document body presents a fake invoice and payment confirmation, instructing the user to enable editing and open the embedded file, which is a common lure. The embedded OLE object contains a .lnk file, suggesting it is designed to execute a payload. A URL associated with the embedded object was recovered: https://corporateplatform.info/changelog.php.

Heuristics 8

  • OOXML Ole10Native with payload/link indicators — possible CVE-2026-21514 high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Office document contains embedded OLE (word/embeddings/oleObject2.bin) with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. This is a likely CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape.
  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • External hyperlinks (1) low OOXML_EXTERNAL_HYPERLINKS
    Document contains 1 external hyperlink — clickable URLs are stored as external relationships. First target: http://eway.ca/
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
    An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://corporateplatform.info/changelog.php In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://eway.ca/Document hyperlink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject2.bin 5120 bytes
SHA-256: e13068f97eafba58d1c0a5fc9af27c14b8952817136b48efa79168f33ba80cca
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject2.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 2860 bytes
SHA-256: 93e60a694449b6d4647a9e9278b5d64aa602173add7414926f4e7c1c83363e76
ooxml_oleobject_01.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 5120 bytes
SHA-256: 250d8d9b99660575c471e94ca7f09b18b4e4145835958a3269fce4bc35b7455c
ooxml_oleobject_01_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 2848 bytes
SHA-256: 6907befe433a7dee2c7c7a66939322b1abe3be3673b4ea73ff1efe7af86bc9fb
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5172 bytes
SHA-256: 63e9e3b6ebd6d0ef130ab5685b79bd9669127101074236f1a94e7a15cf0b8da8
emf_01.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5188 bytes
SHA-256: 1fa5a33adffcf56bce98cace348a9a6e8cd1740140aa951f622979437b00db96