Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3dbcdea65f016d0f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

659.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 168cec805e54ef9b17adec56ec0559c3 SHA-1: 6a75ff72aca960761432a7e523144f4147f600f1 SHA-256: 3dbcdea65f016d0f6d0087c54970decb37b4d9189528eb8286dd2a58d7d38523
150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates the file is designed to exploit a vulnerability in OLE to load remote content. The embedded URL points to a suspicious domain and appears to be a lure for a trial download, likely a pretext for delivering malware. The secondary embedded PDF also contains suspicious findings, suggesting a multi-stage attack. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the primary exploit vector is clear.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • NOP-equivalent sled detected medium SC_NOP_EQUIV_SLED
    Long run of 0x43 bytes
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_001_off0001d484.bin
9599658cc9eae50662a589134de51ec670e648f453a28cffaa4d13a581396cbb
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x1D484 285576 bytes
stream_018_off00077c98.bin
cab0eabf04a5d34936562832ff53bf107c823929526a3b58826cc1b60b8c2bbc
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x77C98 66548 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00073fc0.bin
5e68e88c987c54e64a4d101ad3db57add9e4929aeec402e4fee53d1cd7aa537a
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x73FC0 40548 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off0007eec7.bin
dcf6f0923ad448731206952ff57c4d2b3e8620fc6972598ab1bd23d28e62ab42
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7EEC7 56496 bytes
font_04_sfnt_off000845f5.bin
31710cdfd216f38fb46a851db560161e19419f08661279aff779873a436d680d
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x845F5 5220 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001600.pdf
dd136c8885edf76b7b39972aea4aaf48fb2819611ecd02e4910047a0d44a0667
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1600 669184 bytes