Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3db5aa12d288357a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

48.2 KB Created: 2020-10-17 10:35:28 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-10
MD5: 5e639db1b0dda4a43d464b9cbdb1a6f7 SHA-1: 33c93b163af23f08f65ec18fb386e131a35999d2 SHA-256: 3db5aa12d288357a7e0bec9696b2b8d95a100af11e2e2e960e48c3b73253133c
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/123?keyword=shareit+apk+for+windows+10+download In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366627/normal_5f875e985941a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4371783/normal_5f891b2e9471b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366350/normal_5f88a58f505b6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369632/normal_5f88d4a275f81.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vozunutav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969695/likepavakelavug-foriguvu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pudukodup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407572/8643958.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kiteginizi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871518/fizuwanipapuzita.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vibebivenef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131412032/2f8ca042a26b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/zanadutut_wexudafenatogun_jetomefoja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fizolapojola.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383549/9304137.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rigonabex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483185/saxexovupewub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/dolopitubolagu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xawuwotogot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695388/78b214.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vozunutav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969695/vubogiliku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nijubalalo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453980/12f53c87f87.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sozivutapadonen.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164462/2038155.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://medizagokitoni.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303310/2613559.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0266/9586/0399/files/notofa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/0224/7838/files/22662473975.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0500/0436/1366/files/69235241086.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000666e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x666E 5372 bytes
SHA-256: 8b07f1f163aceb730a51f6c361ea22084640daf165078e78c839167ca6fa6508
font_01_sfnt_off000078b7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x78B7 14292 bytes
SHA-256: 56ea67b70e4bfe38a34ddd89dea316a176b4b46560a39a1b80dc29ee0a407a46
font_02_sfnt_off0000a575.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA575 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 05d2457133b820fa77aa358e30e9acfbad3f04c46ced9a37296d9311117db176

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.