Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3d950c50125e5949…

MALICIOUS

PDF

70.7 KB Created: 2021-02-10 20:45:15 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: e190418d531fb231d38e33355a0a92bd SHA-1: 6126d0b6d7c92347c0278ad017fc44e0a060fbe5 SHA-256: 3d950c50125e5949b4f42b8326668b95046e20259e48fb00f7862e0445bafc18
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains numerous external links, many of which point to disposable domains and are likely part of a link farm designed to distribute malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, specifically phishing. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and heuristic firings suggest it's designed to redirect users to potentially harmful websites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://maypoin.ru/aws?utm_term=academic+reading+answer+sheet+ielts PDF link annotation
    • https://zosafetudosejo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134670517/6a5ae.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://giretalude.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134677333/razulano.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://megaparegeduze.iblogger.org/35470358745.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tosolizidovi/jjabbgi/lazusaforaloboganegugogu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vugezaselefobop.iblogger.org/16744678634.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nogonosexenepe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134674491/2272870.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wunokebewoz/GhgegjY/fasenulagoragunopesip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bopunesarikimar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453984/sapapal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://furedanoduribi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134681858/2167945.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://grizhoff.ru/wegibegabofalipodotuf1v9o4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xozavefo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134018900/gisuke-nodude.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vifabuwu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606679/3223561.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://prodit.space/8964852484lv8s0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://redilupabisaxo.rf.gd/44317179042.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fafinonez.rf.gd/ec_certificate_of_conformity_example.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d57d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD57D 5436 bytes
SHA-256: 58c99ad6d6d38a0bb4f842705f0010cf957a4bcf6cf7a2abcf50b68e64ac6b25
font_01_sfnt_off0000e7dc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE7DC 11220 bytes
SHA-256: 65e973ade4c60e7e50412185d893549794984957c5b3028c03bb92c3c982b8ae

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