MALICIOUS
402
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
The sample contains a Document_Open macro that is heavily obfuscated and uses CreateObject and ShellExecuteA to execute arbitrary code. The presence of the 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document likely prompts the user to enable macros. The obfuscated loader and the use of ShellExecuteA strongly suggest it downloads and executes a second-stage payload.
Heuristics 12
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Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECTOLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
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Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADERAuto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
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Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXECReference to ShellExecute API
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Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPTReference to Windows Script Host
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Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macro
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CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject call
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GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJGetObject call
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VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LUREDocument instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
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Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
- http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas23031726a449872fcbd7c682803e110c664e39492329167e968e7effe8f3db2f |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 55759 bytes |
ole10native_00.bin39d40d3b4510b5a916a04ed74d651e555d16a0a2ff828de68cf54fd0b113019f |
ole-package | OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1687197318/Ole10Native | 141084 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
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