Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3d615b51cf084e29…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.7 KB Created: 2021-09-21 04:55:09 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: 09ef8c9b470621d8a1a9f28ad6e6c114 SHA-1: 3f24c022161cdf28d8c1f33f80bc60a05f90916f SHA-256: 3d615b51cf084e292ee897eeefbcda27bf19f6c4aff26e3c636b27633e42a71a
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a phishing campaign impersonating Facebook. It contains numerous links, many pointing to compromised WordPress sites, designed to lure users into clicking a malicious URL. The primary attack vector appears to be social engineering, directing users to a potentially credential-harvesting site.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9985

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://catamma.ru/uplcv?utm_term=lords+mobile+kingdom+wars+mod+apk.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://catamma.ru/uplcv?utm_term=lords+mobile+kingdom+wars+mod+apk PDF link annotation
    • https://www.fecomerciomg.org.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16144d08c78fc8---nawofus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://spad.kr/userData/ebizro_board/file/navunuberofofuzewu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://retailcop.ca/files/kivurumarus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://loan-financial.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9dec3e2721a8609f58b5b9540391e0d9/labevisosofimexoruxalazow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://naim.naparts.com/images/fck/file/59735771346.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://greshamgilessalon.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/58195238a83119d50c2624728572803e/dovaxobapenukinalaxa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://studioriboldi.eu/userfiles/files/2818815321.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://residenceraffaellotorino.com/userfiles/files/83976942967.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.libyamonitor.com/sites/all/libraries/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sugokepo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://022-web.cn/uploadfile/file/20210906170259388.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://coverybox.box8websites.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/35060839837.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://blueleaves.ru/userfiles/file/44839607490.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://telewebmarketing.com/FCKeditor/file/jifasepetukadewireva.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ne-moloko.ee/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/869b209c7e2de26d49935e0f61e82ab0/5435487036.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bosgo.mn/uploads/files/52973958802.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://obermeyer-modemarkt.de/upload/file/bogaregeneviwemiwavewi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gzxmbx.com/uploadfile/file/2021092004220873499.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://twinmd.ru/userfiles/file/61703184590.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ippinnudon.com/uploads/files/69571106021.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.inhd.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1612eca782c580---82959285209.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://groupkaishan.com/d/files/82503970917.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e367.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE367 10912 bytes
SHA-256: 6b6655b464d043730d00915e631f72888c81e375093fae98fd383595a614fa1d
font_01_sfnt_off0000fc37.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFC37 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00011449.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11449 18724 bytes
SHA-256: c8e743c8e1c49f2717f5d3ab597efabbd673ca9cd80253a4a0786741efd70eda

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