Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3d5bd6d721715663…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.3 KB Created: 2021-04-03 02:49:12 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-22
MD5: 4ace2bca19e6df81115a1789f27f70d2 SHA-1: d16bd6535c8ffabf0b8ee7b9cdaaeda93f12d27f SHA-256: 3d5bd6d7217156634e73d36afc6bc0b2376cccd048d75ec3c1fbc92629a286ba
266 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains an embedded script and heuristics indicate it is designed to lure the user into executing a PowerShell script on startup. The document body and heuristics explicitly mention 'Windows powershell script on startup', and an external URL is present that reinforces this theme. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9991

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pelibifir.ru/strik?utm_term=windows+powershell+script+on+startup PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4489247/normal_6025cbf212d67.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://kavakedego.scienceontheweb.net/tipoge.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4421201/normal_601ca1b53aa03.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://form-copyrightservices.com/werupinibixezuvepo6dfd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zekojotewakugag.mypressonline.com/cambiar_formato_de_fecha_en_windows_10.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4387826/normal_6041610290dc5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4463830/normal_6023e2ab25e94.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://leludezoz.scienceontheweb.net/if_function_in_excel_2020_tutorial.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4416504/normal_5fcf2dfb873df.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4392871/normal_600b4f2325f41.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zowajomi/aTEPyhi/13678917771.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4456391/normal_604e60589ea1c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://leziwazedo.mypressonline.com/menawamiwasibi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xojuxelase.medianewsonline.com/kodufufasexisalawina.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dimax-matrasy.ru/vixetilapufudwuj16.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/dikizumi/dNhgghV/72334194278.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4365660/normal_5fceff1f9c5e3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4496824/normal_6064c4f9eebfe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/rabovafom/gfitUEc/50068660270.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4373509/normal_5fcc0c3374e22.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zadonito.iblogger.org/free_isometric_paper.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://favekagopu.epizy.com/51241567133.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sesoxevanadike.epizy.com/vefevejowutekipoxuxesaveb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://badidadawuf.rf.gd/honda_rebel_1100_release_date_europe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fujatelet.epizy.com/cisco_esa_cluster_configuration_guide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00012beb.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x12BEB 1623 bytes
SHA-256: 2b7c6a0f3f161d004472277bd1302395baa7a0273280e100ab63fc0418831549
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='OpenOffice.org'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Zowibonawo Liwate</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Windows powershell script on startup.   Group Policy allows you to run various script files at a computer startup/shutdown or during user </rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Windows powershell script on startup.   Group Policy allows you to run various script files at a computer startup/shutdown or during user </rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Windows powershell script on startup</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='OpenOffice.org'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-07-28T22:17:38'
  xmp:CreatorTool='OpenOffice.org'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='5b76c6e9-0f5d-4670-9606-f6a4a5e3d337'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='5868e9f7-8707-48e9-b758-98d63d44d53a'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000e984.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE984 5264 bytes
SHA-256: cdfe04ba7029decb9f9d16e194351734132c0a7edbd889b6c8a9000cc9f18ec8
font_01_sfnt_off0000fb7b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFB7B 11800 bytes
SHA-256: 1454dda617a3f7010541c84aa759760f60c42943b51ce4902cddf5bc7690fea1

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