Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3d3282aedac4a337…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

245.6 KB Created: 2020-12-17 14:32:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: d4551f977bfd48f27888753d481e94d7 SHA-1: aa1d7f8b65dc98aa56f4153fab56762cfd8f5b5d SHA-256: 3d3282aedac4a337a36917b4930bc3d4bfdd36235a4af4d71ce600376822e090
64 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The document contains an embedded OLE object, identified as a risky file type. This object, named 'ooxml_oleobject_00.bin' and 'ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin', is likely a dropper for a malicious payload. The presence of these embedded objects strongly suggests an attempt to execute arbitrary code or deliver malware.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
6dde8b95c809bb332b023b4cf504c47b9e2c12737bdbaf9be3c29ab02f0631fd		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 240640 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
1b11237edf20510954a4b5d7602bb0afec7cbf0a72b71c325d0a1c9b85f04452		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 236094 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
3fba6bfbe712c9bc090697e123a1e8951c502812311131fee202d1c278343e2b		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

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