Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3cfe4714d8a8f1b9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

7.6 KB
MD5: 2bedca4371cb6004604a21781a6130e3 SHA-1: adc1933d60054b7ecf0dc81b93a988ee99f8419f SHA-256: 3cfe4714d8a8f1b9033a76321dc69d7ba6b1de3ed833a5545d4a5bc4a8eab5b9
346 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that exploits known Adobe Reader vulnerabilities (CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, CVE-2008-2992). The JavaScript is heavily obfuscated and uses custom Base64 decoding to hide the exploit payload. The primary intent is to achieve arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine by leveraging these client-side exploits. No document body text was available for analysis, but the heuristics strongly indicate a exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 10

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • OpenAction trigger high PDF_OPENACTION
    PDF has an /OpenAction — code runs automatically when opened
  • eval() call high PDF_EVAL
    eval() found — commonly used for obfuscated exploit execution (matched inside decoded stream)
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • String.fromCharCode low PDF_FROMCHARCODE
    String.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically. Common in benign JavaScript libraries for codepoint manipulation, so this alone is informational; weaponised use is also caught by the dedicated fromCharCode-stage and exploit-shape rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0009_000.js
71cd1eeba383e6aedc71e8cb5ed29d4dd1895d72d482bed08880813f53f88156
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0xD6 19688 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
custom_b64_stage_000.js
15895635891981cab63990ac9f11871d8810f4181fe10ed8229c0c85a89b9493
deobfuscated-js custom Base64 decoded JavaScript layer 2 (PDF /JS object 9) at offset 0x450 10550 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 9 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).