Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3cea21e1e6e745af…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

61.0 KB First seen: 2023-10-18
MD5: dc363b6052868aab9a332c698e1e8adb SHA-1: 02bc8553ddc733c4664480d468eab5c5e7cb9cc9 SHA-256: 3cea21e1e6e745af75da939a45f464f609caa208f65b43861c82d8df55b311c2
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object with a specific Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive forces OLE activation, and the document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing'. This combination strongly suggests a malicious document designed to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003f58.bin
75d37a7b4a13db1fc0974ce7c039cdcac94c76f1886558711dd339d17d6f38f4
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3F58 1388 bytes