Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3ce57b497e528ac3…

MALICIOUS

RTF

30.3 KB First seen: 2023-07-06
MD5: 59926b69f6b1dce035ba256215430c52 SHA-1: 470bf50ea96ad1aec5d44ba3c019825729e9e784 SHA-256: 3ce57b497e528ac34a6921d7b91a4fe2211f066a751836206706f8c792ebb367
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains an OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate suggests that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic to bypass security measures and facilitate the execution of embedded exploits.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005225.bin
4c3017c1b7eb063d42de399985724a4fa7fb6fd8e5314a7d7c14d6f940d0a477
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5225 1692 bytes