Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3cded0e14cfa0aa3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.30 MB
MD5: b2dce56af2804b03860deb4f1c63845d SHA-1: f3fc12c64689490b1aa406f064fdc1aba8e85ddf SHA-256: 3cded0e14cfa0aa3d21ee27c442dee7c7bfb7399694d979ed43ed37f016b97e3
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML file is encrypted with a default password and contains embedded OLE objects, specifically identified as Equation Editor objects. This strongly suggests it's designed as an exploit carrier, likely leveraging a known vulnerability within the Equation Editor to execute arbitrary code. No specific scripts or document body text were extracted, limiting further analysis of the payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.