Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3caa329b0511eb66…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

529.3 KB
MD5: 74aa9c35b5f7cb40c016e7e96094d3db SHA-1: 5b0b76b2d85f5b9a46c24db88b7a37ed19704479 SHA-256: 3caa329b0511eb664ca67ccb4a1018ec1819f846a8d628a7eb7fd8df69a2ee86
102 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample exhibits characteristics of a malicious document, including XOR-encoded strings and embedded URLs, suggesting an attempt to download and execute a secondary payload. The OLE slack anomaly and the inability to extract VBA macros indicate a potentially obfuscated or malformed document structure. The presence of embedded URLs is a primary indicator of a delivery mechanism for further malicious content.

Heuristics 3

  • XOR-encoded strings (key 0x92) critical SC_XOR_ENCODED
    Found 2 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0x92: 'advapi32.dll', 'shell32.dll'
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 541,993 bytes but its declared streams total only 0 bytes — 541,993 bytes (100%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.