Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3c59aab375e8ebf7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

2.24 MB Created: 2022-08-11 14:33:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-11
MD5: 9cbf5c3239d290b08ba1f0d8617b6802 SHA-1: e0fab1bc0137f946134c22f27bd9f1bb9484c785 SHA-256: 3c59aab375e8ebf7a3da914e7f1f38c6c54947b4c27c73c5c591ab27152dfe4d
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OOXML document containing a VBA project with a renamed part, indicating an attempt to evade detection. The presence of a Document_Open macro, GetObject, CallByName, and a VBA property-stored shellcode loader suggests the macro is designed to execute malicious code. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'Enable editing' and 'Enable content', a common lure to bypass Office macro security. The VBA script itself is heavily obfuscated, but the heuristics indicate it likely loads shellcode from document properties and executes it.

Heuristics 9

  • VBA property-stored shellcode loader critical OLE_VBA_PROPERTY_SHELLCODE_LOADER
    VBA auto-exec macro takes the address (VarPtr) of a byte buffer decoded from a document property, marks memory executable (VirtualProtect/VirtualAlloc), and transfers control through a callback API (e.g. SetTimer/EnumWindows). The payload is hidden in the document properties rather than the macro source — the SVCReady loader pattern, a native shellcode runner rather than a parser CVE.
  • VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMED
    The VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME
    CallByName call
  • VBA reads reversed config from document properties high OLE_VBA_REVERSED_DOCPROP_CONFIG
    VBA applies StrReverse to values read from the document's custom/built-in properties. Storing reversed configuration (URLs, CLSIDs, env-var names, payload names) in document properties keeps indicators out of the macro source — an obfuscation technique used by the SVCReady loader.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: word/ifxhEYhbCZ.bin)
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
402c652a83772ec8c07494b7c052cfcaf9fde01eb9db6861877854751b549b6c		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 21155 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
fd395cf92227e7d68964649d631b1c760fe5cc0689d66d77c07575895130ebff		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/ifxhEYhbCZ.bin 14848 bytes

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