RTF malware analysis — malicious · 3c3a24cdf448656b

MALICIOUS

RTF

24.8 KB First seen: 2023-07-06

MD5: 20630c0707f4913e69098a048ff472eb SHA-1: 8c0ea02a91c27efe4f3516e73fd4f4c4953f6ced SHA-256: 3c3a24cdf448656b954283085caf6d82854c3c5d9a9162f9da347330a1cc38e9

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF file contains an OLE object and triggers the Equation Editor exploit, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic confirms the document attempts to trick the user into enabling content, a common tactic for macro-based malware delivery. The embedded OLE object data is likely the initial stage of the exploit chain.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00004b3e.bin` `56358d152ce227c7d071f2a751130d50a820db47da53ca0390ad2086604e1941`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x4B3E	1511 bytes

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