Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3c2b467cc8527d2e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.7 KB
MD5: 387a538b470dbcb7cc01f855b2191b71 SHA-1: 0af386f23b23366f1f791758781f68de6a242754 SHA-256: 3c2b467cc8527d2e5a057bbac803bf3820838fb1eba1c8f961a7c20f971e1ad9
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded Equation.3 object and the \objupdate control word, which is a classic signature of CVE-2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802. No scripts were extracted from this sample, but the presence of OLE activation and the Equation Editor attack surface strongly indicates an attempt to trigger a memory corruption vulnerability for code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b0.bin
ec6d9f3cc720c503ea04409d6ec2c1c43274ccba3cd55114e2c5bf4fe4268fec		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB0 1555 bytes

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