Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3c022871e1b3e740…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.0 KB Created: 2020-11-08 17:26:59 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-21
MD5: 164e0d47fdcb2d0c207bff9db4aa5634 SHA-1: 12e35e1b1b7f26fa3980721053d5128f0bb54984 SHA-256: 3c022871e1b3e740b1b1d9beba19cca285bb4ea14dffc02a3d178b8f08630fdb
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with a critical heuristic firing indicating it points to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that appears to be a lure for a camera manual. The presence of a link farm and a malicious redirector suggests an attempt to drive traffic to potentially harmful sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/123?keyword=eos+t6i+manual In PDF document text
    • https://xironudobavus.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134461104/vofasezanose_banobatej_fadobumamifeju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jivexine.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380908/6815031.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jujarodi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134507231/kifurir-voborewul-bupopurosixot-moziximuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://movulejovem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134470355/xanuzaju-salovoponat-pewimadepawo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rokufekajo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814342/54cf17e6204c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mawoluji.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134265904/ac761bf9542e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://weniwekozeg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134012595/6423132.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lumodafudewose.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134480169/kival.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://lukowamur.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/12360077798.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zewavidopexebi/college_board_login_for_teachers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fojalotidunu.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/que_es_modelo_pedagogico.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nimuwet/91185251893.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vedexajawo/kijuwiseravipatenojipulid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000065f8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x65F8 4844 bytes
SHA-256: 7da3e8cf65b8bcdd9968595fb67642625877d33180943fff4b1f299a5cc9f950
font_01_sfnt_off0000765f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x765F 11540 bytes
SHA-256: ff2718a3e336811108e0c4c5589e56d512a2cff6bc3dc75699edf0200da93236

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