Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3bde19d7784dcbc3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

99.0 KB Created: 2021-08-02 13:27:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 5bfd6492ea3a24923c5a8c4623327a4e SHA-1: 583635007dd0ceb383455decd298d0e437d795d3 SHA-256: 3bde19d7784dcbc3c23fd363516c1d589f9dc24feacbb8be8797e61e7dde9ecf
622 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1137.001 Office Application Startup: Office Application T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File

This OOXML document contains VBA macros that trigger on document open (AutoOpen, Document_Open, Workbook_Open). The macros reference PowerShell and use WMI (Win32_Process) via CreateObject to launch processes, indicating a downloader or execution capability. The presence of a password-protected archive lure suggests a multi-stage attack where the macro likely facilitates the download and execution of the actual payload.

Heuristics 15

  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • External relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL
    External target in word/_rels/settings.xml.rels: file:///C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Templates\1031\AdjacencyReport.dotx
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://github.com/mgeeky/VisualBasicObfuscator
    • https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/07ffbd9dbb64c80afe05fb45a0f66f81
    • https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/61e4dfe305ab719e9874ca442779a91d
    • https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/9cb6acdec31c8a70cc037c84c77a359c
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
f29d3198576edbbf16502891a0490035158f190246ec0d4a0ba6f20816769b96
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 15468 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
0e7c347447204b0f9b73c6ad4347e15b70798f95ea1b5ba9bab21b2384158f35
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 61440 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely