Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3bdd4c36219194b8…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

13.2 KB
MD5: b97a228b145b109f2d658b0b5643a777 SHA-1: 0f154af238b814b4311a383aaff9b770162b27e6 SHA-256: 3bdd4c36219194b89e4f8df7a09278c233233ce3939a1cbc6d35361018c444e1
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to exploit this vulnerability for code execution. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads. No specific family could be identified.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000005b0.bin
2c7f979df95adfae07d6b14adcf7f8a2ec1ace2dc8b324a21db5ceeaf4192af1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5B0 1611 bytes