Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3bc4ee3c72301833…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.6 KB Created: 2021-02-20 23:11:49 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-06-17
MD5: a20cfb01dcb124b825d9d23777c395b1 SHA-1: 9ac1e9eacae6a2293d6d1f3b45a794e15c2d610b SHA-256: 3bc4ee3c723018337884e6d85de6d17295e2b63a6afead34a7e896cef85c58c1
126 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many pointing to disposable hosting and configured as a link farm, which is a common tactic for phishing or distributing further malware. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URIs suggest it's designed to redirect users to malicious sites, likely as part of a phishing campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://baarspo.ru/wix?keyword=proform+crosstrainer+56+parts PDF link annotation
    • http://zakutefog.iblogger.org/movie_catalogue_app_android.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vobefoli.iblogger.org/neural_network_backward_propagation.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4504047/normal_5fec935d25e74.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/mugegiduveb/WB2ejcg/derwent_vs_faber_castell_graphite_pencils.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lajulufubugo.22web.org/12781700209.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tamowigaxijatot.66ghz.com/sugomakugitujafuru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4371543/normal_5fee067dc46ed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jedugefipevama.iblogger.org/anand_telugu_movie_full.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gibitomenufe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134041720/palozomiwagozukutito.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://fudowoxalukiki.rf.gd/aves_de_rapina_hq.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zulegaxevo.epizy.com/45327631336.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jizagedades.rf.gd/68939450777.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zulonojaminipe.rf.gd/43685410623.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nofifejagarenut.epizy.com/causes_of_antepartum_hemorrhage.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dd64.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDD64 5196 bytes
SHA-256: 87ef9a2f0b4658a963394790ebf7ba4a3fdf7582323e3cab5c2cac5a7e04866b
font_01_sfnt_off0000eee7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEEE7 14332 bytes
SHA-256: 48a1edc172330825706b689f794da3c5f342751933e5da894470252ddb656e19
font_02_sfnt_off00011b9e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11B9E 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 4fcfa7c68d76e23b667942a3ac892d2d5d88346478daafc61479ad4df4af3dd3

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