Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3bc4bab1875797f7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.6 KB Created: 2021-09-23 12:55:47 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 6ce8b3e9e1b984adba9f18e4d1954018 SHA-1: 0910359249b31e43e138a4245ee0d7c265c2f0e1 SHA-256: 3bc4bab1875797f755bdc3b60b9ff17b95c72976d2190e0aca96561b42bebb32
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file contains numerous embedded URLs that function as a link farm, directing users to potentially malicious or phishing websites. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. The presence of external URIs and compromised CMS upload links further supports this assessment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9951

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://catamma.ru/uplcv?utm_term=android+find+my+android
    • http://machinegroup.ru/img/outer/files/diwikuripi.pdf
    • http://langeline.com/ckeditor/upload/files/jizewuzajovixekilok.pdf
    • http://www.garriagricola.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614bc6bad7924---38858531483.pdf
    • https://unovosti.tv/ckfinder/userfiles/files/2012032026.pdf
    • http://www.sudeshnamaulik.com/fckimages/file/xopawaxisorolozoki.pdf
    • http://www.mamafoundation.cz/ckfinder/userfiles/files/20365078308.pdf
    • http://drivingschool-brno.eu/files/kepobatebefor.pdf
    • http://spy-military-labs.com/userfiles/file/mebugugima.pdf
    • http://epwuae.com/userfiles/file/lazoji.pdf
    • http://vibrator4you.cz/UserFiles/File/41783059718.pdf
    • http://pescepiana.eu/userfiles/files/renanovogexiw.pdf
    • http://stowarzyszeniemalyksiaze.eu/img/upload/files/boludetotikafutatodezaw.pdf
    • http://paradisoseminatrici.it/userfiles/files/xeligavun.pdf
    • https://bonaparte.cappencms.com/templates/files/14447442930.pdf
    • http://china-spec.ru/userfiles/file/37926824293.pdf
    • https://hightechrustremovers.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613e4201b4dc0---81536778519.pdf
    • http://secretlove.ch/ckfinder/userfiles/files/88167976026.pdf
    • http://sudeoksa.org/userfiles/file/20210916214843.pdf
    • http://yanartekstil.com/firma/files/fulasogivabaserugejij.pdf
    • http://unternehmensberatung-hegenbarth.de/userfiles/file/visunatijawudevidabap.pdf
    • https://www.etbsupplies.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614c272feb529---21685157913.pdf
    • http://bubblesoflove.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16141be55b0805---24239014499.pdf
    • http://miraesusan.com/ckupload/files/vozezixefegafexokelewili.pdf
    • http://naturalmis.com/userfiles/file/donisewugidizaporuroxedu.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e7f9.bin
5a591862c3ed2c4928e54494ae6aeeaae2bcf251ac6109e03f2baf2e7d4906b6
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE7F9 10168 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000fea8.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFEA8 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000116ba.bin
0a249ceda917753c1e7a644c5e93a2ae65335ebd62cf75f7b64b08b808a7f5b1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x116BA 17344 bytes