Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3ba5a5d27f209c05…

MALICIOUS

RTF

11.5 KB
MD5: 2cc05a1c5eddac8787d2aba98ba1fdc6 SHA-1: bf07f86c118c065a420fab70b050b0356616a56f SHA-256: 3ba5a5d27f209c05b6af95dc9299d5fb37a6a7332fc6871c427eb9b13c477377
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object specifically identified as an Equation Editor exploit (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of \objupdate and objdata heuristics indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated, likely leading to the execution of a secondary payload. No document body text or scripts were extracted, but the exploit itself is sufficient evidence of malicious intent.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000167e.bin
b102dcfd432a84c5421c1baabc98affe102233aea1ca6243d3a10eb939c7e6a2
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x167E 1561 bytes