PDF malware analysis — malicious · 3b97c539ca3c0ef0

MALICIOUS

PDF

10.1 KB

MD5: 91a45ca7ffc868700db7480dabba9356 SHA-1: e9eeda611707fbf6acb3ee05b25e6ea68233ade2 SHA-256: 3b97c539ca3c0ef0819245db77a8f60b5d1111f716fb5c30f72c11e7db2210dd

138 Risk Score

Malware Insights

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2010-0188 indicates that this PDF document exploits a known vulnerability in Adobe Reader. The PDF contains XFA forms and uses unescape() calls, which are common in exploit delivery. The embedded file and script payload heuristics suggest that the exploit is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. No specific family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with exploit-laced documents.

Heuristics 7

Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188

PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE

unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
XFA form low PDF_XFA

PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic (matched inside decoded stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_file_obj0010.bin` `d81baa73e490e4cb879e13927cacd1dd1be37524a37eac51603e15117c578777`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 10 at offset 0x122D	84 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0011.bin` `24c130f03a4cf51d470b536e94c1e58af67665739e200e0ce198ad41086243c0`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 11 at offset 0x12E2	228 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0012.bin` `93362532ad25bbfd0bed552139b139c5fe9b93e0d13734557f6eb8cccf9de902`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 12 at offset 0x13D7	8863 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
`embedded_file_obj0014.bin` `c97e0522381d6196cc0695f35f4d065f15c9c86a9601a7f776c6afd3f4c6b460`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 14 at offset 0x20C0	199 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0015.bin` `3028a83799fbeb61ac2800d74d4856ea4a1881d183b1a7585c95ad2458fdecc2`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 15 at offset 0x21B5	154 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0016.bin` `e6c26a3478346d27e841ad49868ebf68bf4c6863b6750e8d60bda3c4c6f79876`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 16 at offset 0x228A	77 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0017.bin` `92a3ce61d783e15932b5de127ce45a9b4c2f98f4da2453f65241573c1dda808a`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 17 at offset 0x2334	56 bytes
`stream_004_off00001f52.bin` `b7b324d6866e440f71eac20ea362a7f63b5964a5c0e986bbcc7608795d502183`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x1F52	11386 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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