Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3b92e4ec9bef3fb7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.7 KB Created: 2020-10-11 12:17:58 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: 4e0c51098afc41d8a54f2b456d5f080a SHA-1: 1f61b46d7e858705e9a676524701792468212aaa SHA-256: 3b92e4ec9bef3fb7f4c1b7b044c1fa0a964ca19971b20fd65b22e4ae549aab53
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a significant number of embedded links, with several pointing to known malicious redirector infrastructure and disposable hosting. This suggests a tactic to distribute malware or engage in phishing by overwhelming the user with links. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=canal+sport+free In PDF document text
    • http://pevama.carpediemshows.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873826/5794906.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.gracebaptistchurch77.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070973/5887792.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.picturesquechange.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740456/fekuzefabod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://titop.atcsiberianservicedogs.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407629/4584158.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.moralesarchitects.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696021/5ad2d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038890.mozfiles.com/files/1038890/12814407146.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036871.mozfiles.com/files/1036871/65362437545.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036872.mozfiles.com/files/1036872/6334391797.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039656.mozfiles.com/files/1039656/tuxewer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037222.mozfiles.com/files/1037222/256838371.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9aaf64ad-3207-4cac-84ed-61186229d452/lokolugaribilika.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a1b6a97e-fdce-407e-abd3-d1369ea41233/ziwevimarenatenu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a0fb49df-f486-442b-aadf-e4bdbdb1c5a7/momiged.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9365b851-176b-4e78-acb6-722b3476f42e/71666802465.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/463066ec-558e-45ac-8221-e938def37d0c/monowunafuxinezafuturufe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/fe9d0239-369f-4c6f-b0b5-6da1e75321c2/26004408895.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1e19c819-9006-406e-b783-9fc92498ab17/xamogerulomabimubifep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000067ad.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x67AD 4800 bytes
SHA-256: 9a2830114660bc545cbd914133581360413491a13ed2d3f05e7b45900369fd72
font_01_sfnt_off0000780a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x780A 9940 bytes
SHA-256: 55479e74b2597b9f4115a2f13a71ed1920b04dc014d6c229a92c45bdd7f478a9

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