Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3b6af138a4556178…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

104.1 KB Created: 2020-06-07 23:12:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000
MD5: 46b7fae130112dd777fd353a8921852a SHA-1: 000e225e23eec8184cc5992b5660cbeaaf692c34 SHA-256: 3b6af138a455617841ee30355120b86cb668a55a2ec24ca49bcee9cc52844da2
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The OOXML document contains VBA macros, specifically a Document_Open macro, which is a common technique for initial execution. The presence of CreateObject calls suggests the macro attempts to instantiate objects to perform malicious actions. No specific URLs or network indicators were extracted, but the presence of the VBA macros and the Document_Open heuristic strongly indicate a macro-based execution attack. The extracted artifacts 'macros.bas' and 'vbaProject_00.bin' are direct indicators of the malicious macro content.

Heuristics 5

  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7b1c876f4ac126781e3bcda19e8e6565ecd3964f96a78c9bb392782420d6dc6f		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1632 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
06ab9dbfef01ac753a89d43e5cf0f36b80264f44d85065fafc4d6c19d02d36e2		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 10752 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.