Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3b4561375bec4aae…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.8 KB First seen: 2019-02-26
MD5: dc535b2f7f54042967f36888cfea1cad SHA-1: 3c4f25e577b27bc0992e8e00fcdf4099e336f7d0 SHA-256: 3b4561375bec4aae2a0083986d262be668afe12c05fa3828ca94e92473381252
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating exploitation of a vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The \objupdate directive forces the activation of this object, leading to arbitrary code execution. The document's content is minimal, suggesting the primary purpose is to deliver a malicious payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000049.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x49 1903 bytes
SHA-256: deed06e82d783ec57d54e60828e51e836396900044696844d60c3c96cfe65df5

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.