Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3b14bdfee6115224…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.4 KB Created: 2021-02-20 05:43:26 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: f9b3f65588d482dc4ca5bb0ea19d1a87 SHA-1: 8687ebb064abb294f2e3430825e3149a456e89c0 SHA-256: 3b14bdfee6115224ffc434eb24e00580951cfd9f0f70141dbabb71b5bc6fe3f1
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

This PDF file was identified as malicious by multiple heuristics and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It functions as a link farm, containing numerous external URIs, with a significant number pointing to disposable hosting. The primary purpose appears to be SEO manipulation or directing users to potentially harmful content through a large number of outbound links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://bologen.ru/123?utm_term=why+aren%2527t+my+gears+shifting PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/murafabu/ehcjgZW/4_pics_1_movie_level_28.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kisumeselebo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/6/0/136021012/zavotoxapa_wizaxutataw_tobapevaf_putigojazipog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zazalefofano.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134578352/1594281.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kopilixa/xjjFifV/guradogupoxigelosa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jozojijejip/RRcFNwa/sepofefaxipabefumitosuxeg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xovirekines.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134648888/ecf3c8c26c3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jemitaso/ZxGJhi7/wevana.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://marodesama.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135349202/bumixofoxatab_sujofurut_fesew_wojuba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/naxibibu/iihhjyZ/nostalgia_nes_pro_emulator_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bisubobotikimix.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438323/lobefubogogipu-tokekizasigu-madepuxigiwo-fulufarige.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kewidanuratug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135323433/keruvup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/toliwudalamem/99427104252.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bezorito/18162020471.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dekogamik/vavudumibosaxoxalukawope.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ef3e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEF3E 5296 bytes
SHA-256: fe9a89cec36c1f05c302266792466647c92009defb466a90c9374f997630a82b
font_01_sfnt_off00010137.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10137 10508 bytes
SHA-256: 8a807e068267d32b0dd05136810e0d940b4812f1d490e53a1f1d3b34a90cf283

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