Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3b02018be8e526e7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.77 MB
MD5: 3b7450adbb5d0ebece1425045c213e03 SHA-1: d98231251061f987ea051695d3673c4bb6b67d46 SHA-256: 3b02018be8e526e74028f065ecdb95ea375f51b06cedef844fb1e633c40a7fd7
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an OLE object specifically related to CVE-2017-11882, which is a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor. The presence of excessive hex-encoded data within the OLE object suggests it is used to hide a malicious payload. The file's structure and the specific exploit identified indicate a high likelihood of arbitrary code execution upon opening.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1852KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003e.bin
ed5cfb400266570d5d28163b15b89e86bb04b235010cd50caf1561f549c2fd4d		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3E 926366 bytes

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