Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3afe38893046364a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

16.0 KB
MD5: 176ed913c521fc90d81001b1931977ca SHA-1: 9d0616c6f4d9b95cf19c60bd4f3c369a0d8e5dfb SHA-256: 3afe38893046364a7422754ca9d77d833a42101c2118040ed3fcef62bce0a175
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically related to Equation Editor. Heuristics indicate the activation of Equation Editor with a critical severity, strongly suggesting exploitation of the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the document is opened, leading to a malicious payload delivery.

Heuristics 5

  • Obfuscated Equation Editor ProgID + activation critical CVE related RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID from top-level \objdata hex after nested RTF junk groups are ignored, and the document also contains \objemb plus \objupdate activation. This is an obfuscated Equation Editor exploit surface associated with CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 families, but no exact malformed MTEF CVE primitive was recovered from this object.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000011f6.bin
5bd7025f97184c6ce2bfc1e3b0b7605a8a4e8f4786d61c5ffa1c73e4dc05e43e		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x11F6 1686 bytes

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